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Abstract
The heterogeneous connections model is a generalization of the homogeneous
connections model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) in which the intrinsic value of
each connection is set by a discrete, positive and symmetric function that depends
solely on the types of the two end agents. Core periphery networks are defined as
networks in which the agents' set can be partitioned into two subsets, one in which the
members are completely connected among themselves and the other where there are
no internal links. A two-type society is defined as "power based" if both types of
agents prefer to connect to one of the types over the other, controlling for path length.
An exhaustive analysis shows that core periphery networks, in which the "preferred"
types are in the core and the "rejected" types are in the periphery, are crucial in the
"power based" society. In particular, if the linking costs are not too low and not too
high, at least one such network is pairwise stable. Moreover, in many cases these
networks are the unique pairwise stable networks and in all cases they are the unique
strongly efficient networks. The set of efficient networks often differs from the set of
pairwise stable networks, hence a discussion on this issue is developed. These results
suggest heterogeneity accompanied by "power based" linking preferences as a natural
explanation for many core-periphery structures observed in real life social networks.
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1 Introduction
A network is defined to be a core-periphery network if its set of agents can be
partitioned into two subsets, the core and the periphery, such that each agent in the
core is directly connected to all other core members while each periphery member is
directly connected to none of the other periphery agents1. In this paper we introduce a
simple network formation model in which core periphery networks are the dominant
architecture both as stabile networks and as efficient networks.
Since the 1970's the empirical literature of social networks identified core periphery
architecture as a dominant social structure in many contexts2. Core-periphery
structures were found in macroeconomics in the theory of spatial division of
production (Krugman (1991, 1994) and Fujita et. al (2001)) and in the sociologyoriented world system literature3 (Wallerstein (1974), Chase-Dunn and Grimes (1995)
and Smith and White (1992)). These architectures were found also in industrial
organization, both in general, in the analysis of firms' power structure as reflected in
the interlocking directorates' network (Mintz and Schwartz (1981a, 1981b)) and in
specific industries as the airline industry (Starr and Stinchcombe (1992)) and the local
and long distance phone calls industry (Economides (1996)). Core-periphery
structures were found in formal and informal social organizations as factions and
other quasi-groups based on recruitment by existing members (Boissevain (1968)),
solidarity networks with asymmetries in wealth and status (Fafchamps (1992)),
scientific networks (Brieger (1976), White et. al. (1976), Mullins et. al. (1977),
1

The core-periphery structure is not a well-defined concept in the social sciences literature. Indeed,
most of the researches that use this phrase mean that there is one group of agents that is densely
connected internally, while all the other agents are sparsely connected internally (Borgatti and Everett
(1999)). The definition here is identical to the one in Bramoulle and Kranton (2003) and Bramoulle
(2007). However, network is a core-periphery network by Goyal (2007) if the set of agents can be
partitioned into two subsets, core and periphery, such that each agent in the core is directly connected
to all other core members and each periphery member has a single link to one of the core members.
Galeotti and Goyal (2008) restrict the pattern of links in a core periphery network to be complete –
every peripheral agent is connected to all core agents. Later we will refer to the definition by Goyal
(2007) as minimally connected core periphery networks and to the one by Galeotti and Goyal (2008) as
maximally connected core periphery network. In the mathematical graph theory literature core
periphery networks are called split graphs (Foldes and Hammer (1977) and Brandstadt et. al (2004)).
2
White et. al. (1976) mention that one of the frequent structures they encounter has one group
internally connected and one group internally disconnected which are reciprocally connected between
them.
3
The theory states that national development could only be understood as the complex outcome of local
interactions with an expanding world economy. Further, the world countries have hierarchical power
order of core, semi periphery, and periphery that is reflected both in world economy and in
international relations. The core countries are stronger (e.g. military power) then others and exploit the
weak periphery countries either by tributes or by favorable market conditions. Therefore the core
countries can be distinguished by their internal massive volume of trade and by their capital-intensive
production.
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Granovetter (1983), Grossman and Ion (1995), van der Leij and Goyal (2006)),
internal firms' networks (Krackhardt and Hanson (1993)4) and in the social network of
injecting drug users (Curtis et. al. (1995)).
In most of the empirical examples mentioned above, it is evident that the members of
the core have some intrinsic advantage over the members of the periphery – either the
financial institutions that are positioned in the core of the directorates' network, the
veteran members in factions or the eminent scientists in the scientific networks. In
many cases these advantages do not initially stem from these core members' position
in the network, but they lead their possessors to be extremely central in the social
network. We suggests that in order for the advantageous agents to be placed in a
central position they have to be recognized as more attractive by all the members of
the community, advantageous and disadvantageous. This recognition is the main
source of power of the advantageous agents. Once these agents are placed in a central
position in the social network, their advantage can be reinforced and perpetuated5.
Some network formation models in the social sciences literature6 might suggest
explanations for the formation of core-periphery structures. Models associated with
the structural balance theory, are meant mainly to explain various segregation
architectures. Therefore, these models have to assume some internal animosity among
the periphery members in order to explain the sparse internal network attributed to the
periphery7. Models associated with preferential attachment (also known as degree
variance model) need to assume that core members preceded the periphery members
in the network. The extended preferential attachment model of Bianconi and Barabasi
(2001) adds heterogeneity in the form of fitness into the links accumulation process
4

Krackhardt and Hanson (1993) consider the core-periphery structure as problematic for the firm since
it signals that many workers depend on a small group of central agents. Borgatti (2005) considers it as
favorable structure as efficient spreader of knowledge. However, he points out that since the core
controls the content of the knowledge, these networks might not be good at innovation because it
makes it is easy for the conventional wisdom to swamp new ideas (see also Chubin (1976),
Granovetter (1983) and Bramoulle and Kranton (2003)).
5
Brieger (1976) and White et. al. (1976) found a hierarchy of statuses in the scientific network, where
the upper "class" was known by all the lower strata but unaware of most of them. The internal
awareness of the lower "classes" was partial. Brieger (1976) clarifies (in a footnote) that the term
"status" refers to differentiation of persons on some vertical continuum of "prestige" or "power".
6
See Banks and Carley (1996) for a short survey of the main network formation theories in sociology
and Goyal (2007) and Jackson (2008) for network formation models in economics. See Newman
(2003) for a survey of networked systems models in physics.
7
In this theory, the social structure is a graph in which each link is one or more relations between two
nodes where a signed number describes each relation. The value of a link is the sum of these numbers
and the value of a cycle is the multiplication of its links values. The benefit of a person from a graph is
the sum of values of all the circles that go through him. In the basic version, a cycle is balanced if and
only if its value is positive and a social network is balanced if and only if all its cycles are balanced.
Since people maximize their values, the theory argues that social networks that are balanced will be
stable. See Heider (1946, 1958), Cartwright and Harary (1956), Newcomb (1956, 1961), Davis (1963,
1967), and Doreian and Mrvar (1996).
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and thus enables very fit agents to have higher degree than older, but not as fit, agents.
Moreover, in order to generate the cohesiveness of the core, probably some rewiring
should be introduced on top of the heterogeneity.
Our framework is a generalization of the homogenous connections model of Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996) to accommodate two types. As in the original model, the agents
benefit from their direct connections (costly) and indirect connections. However, the
benefits are a function of the two end agents (the intrinsic value of the connection)
and the distance between them. In the homogeneous model, the star, a degenerative
form of a core periphery network, appears as a dominant architecture. However, the
star network is stable and efficient, independently of the central agent and therefore
the results cannot be interpreted as a process of power perpetuation by central
positioning in the social network.
Some models introduced heterogeneity to the connections model of Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996) through the linking costs rather than through the intrinsic values8.
The important difference between these two approaches is that the linking costs
heterogeneity is relevant only to direct connections, while the intrinsic values are
carried through both direct and indirect connections9. Indeed, it turns out that none of
the versions of the connections model which introduced heterogeneous linking costs
exhibit core periphery networks as either stable or efficient. Moreover, core periphery
networks in which there are more than two agents in the core were not found to be
Nash networks in the various versions of the one-sided model of Bala and Goyal
(2000)10.

8

See Johnson and Gilles (2000), Jackson and Rogers (2005) and Carayol and Roux (2005). Note that
core periphery networks might arise for certain parameters in the two-islands model of Jackson and
Rogers (2005) if the internal linking costs of one island were lower from the external linking costs
while the internal linking costs of the other island were higher from the external linking costs.
9
This issue was approached also by Galeotti (2006) and Galeotti et. al. (2006), which introduced
heterogeneity in both costs and benefits to the one-sided one-flow and the one-sided two-flow
formation models of Bala and Goyal (2000), respectively. They find that cost heterogeneity affects both
the connectedness and the architecture of the Nash networks. However, in the one-flow model the
value heterogeneity affects both the connectedness and the architecture, while in two-flow it affects
only the connectedness. We, on the other hand, find no effect of heterogeneity on the connectedness
and a significant effect on the architecture.
10
See Galeotti (2006), Galeotti et. al. (2006), Hojman and Szeidl (2008) and Feri (2007). Core
periphery networks cannot be stable also in the framework of McBride (2006) unless possibly under
certain parameters in the case where the agents know only their direct friends in the network. Hojman
and Szeidl (2006) show the conditions under which a socially "gifted" agent becomes the center of their
stable star architecture. However, it seems hard to extend this example to core periphery networks.
Zeggelink (1995) introduces a network formation model with two types of agents. In this model the
agents' loss depends on her deviation from her exogenous ideal state which is characterized by an ideal
number of friends, all of them are similar to her. These myopic agents take part in a dynamic process,
in which friendship connection must be reciprocated, until they reach as near as possible to their ideal
position. However, none of the simulations of this model generated a core-periphery network.
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Galeotti and Goyal (2008) suggest a homogeneous explanation for the formation of
core periphery networks. In their model, an agent can either acquire information
personally or gather information from agents that acquired it personally. They show
that if information could be gathered only directly from one of the agents that
acquired it personally, every stable network is a core periphery network where the
core includes the agents that acquired the information personally and the periphery
include the agents that need to gather the information through the network.
In what follows we will introduce heterogeneity into the connections model of
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) in order to analyze the case in which all the members of
the society acknowledge the advantage of one of the types and therefore prefer linking
to agents of this type over other agents. Under this setting of unanimous preferences
towards the advantageous type, we will show that core periphery networks are both
pairwise stable (unique in many cases) and uniquely efficient and discuss cases of
tension between these two concepts.
The next section will introduce the heterogeneous connections model and define a
"power based" society. It will also define several special architectures of core
periphery networks that will become useful in the analysis. The third section will give
a complete characterization of the stable and efficient networks of the "power based"
society to show that core-periphery structures play a major role in this context. The
last section will conclude with a detailed interpretation of the results and some natural
and possible future research directions.
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2 The Model
Preliminaries
Consider a finite set N = {1,2,K, n} of utility-maximizing agents. The complete
network, g N , is the set of all subsets of N of size two, while the empty network is the

{

}

empty set. The set of all possible networks on N is g | g ⊆ g N . Denote by ij the
element of g N that contains i and j. If ij ∈ g we say that agents i and j are directly
connected in network g. Denote by N (i, g ) = { j ∈ N | ij ∈ g } the set of agent i's
neighbors in network g. Let g + ij denote the network obtained by adding the link ij
to the network g and let g − ij denote the network obtained by severing the link ij
from the network g. A path p of length L( p ) between agent i and agent j in network g
is a set of distinct nodes {i1 , i2 , i3 , K , i L ( p ) , i L ( p )+1 } such that {i1i 2 , i 2 i3 , K , i L ( p )i L ( p )+1 } ⊆ g
and i1 = i, i L ( p )+1 = j . Let k ∈ p and denote the position of agent k in path p by t k ( p ) ,
meaning, t k ( p ) = x ⇔ i x = k . If a path between agent i and agent j exists in network
g, we say that agent i and agent j are connected in network g. Otherwise, we say that

agent i and agent j are disconnected in network g. If agent i and agent j are connected
but not directly connected in network g, we say that agent i and agent j are indirectly
connected in network g. For a subset of the agents' set N ′ ⊆ N , define a subnetwork
g ′ to be the set of all pairs of agents i, j ∈ N ′ such that ij ∈ g . The subnetwork
g ′ ⊆ g is a component of network g if for all pairs of agents i, j ∈ N ′ , agent i and
agent j are connected in g' and there is no pair of agents i ∈ N ′, j ∈ N − N ′ such that
~
ij ∈ g . Denote by N (i, g ) the set of agents that reside in the same component as agent
i in network g. If for each pair of agents i, j ∈ N , agent i and agent j are connected in
g, we say that g is connected. A path p between agent i and agent j in network g is a
shortest path between those agents if there is no other path p ′ between them such
that L( p ′) < L( p ) . Denote the set of all shortest paths between agent i and agent j in
network g by S (i, j , g ) , its cardinality by sij and the path's length by d ij . Let

{

}

S k (i, j , x, g ) = s ∈ S (i, j , g ) | k ∈ s, t k (s ) = x be the set of all shortest paths between
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agent i and agent j in network g such that agent k is in position x and denote its
cardinality by sijk ( x ) 11.

The homogeneous symmetric connections model without side payments

Jackson & Wolinsky (1996) introduces the homogeneous symmetric connections
model without side payments. In this model, the utility of agent i from network g is

u i (g ) = ∑ δ
j ≠i

d ij

−

∑c

where 0 < δ < 1 captures the idea that the value that agent i

j:ij∈g

derives from being connected to agent j is proportional to their proximity and c > 0 is
the universal direct connection costs12. The network g is pairwise stable with respect
to the utility function if for every existing link, both its agents would not gain by
severing it ( ∀ij ∈ g : u i ( g ) ≥ u i ( g − ij ), u j ( g ) ≥ u j ( g − ij ) ) and for every non-existing
link, either at least one of its agents strictly loses from forming it or both agents do not
gain from forming it ( ∀ij ∉ g : u i ( g + ij ) > u i ( g ) ⇒ u j ( g ) > u j ( g + ij ) ). The network g
is strongly efficient if there is no other network on N for which the sum of utilities
(denoted by v( g ) ) is higher ( ∀g ′ ≠ g : v( g ) ≡ ∑ u i ( g ) ≥ ∑ u i (g ′) ≡ v( g ′) ). A star
i∈N

i∈N

network is a network in which there is a central agent who is directly connected to all
other agents in N while these other agents are connected directly only to her.
propositions 1 and 2 in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) characterizes stability and
efficiency in the homogeneous symmetric connections model by identifying four
possible relations between the linking costs and the depreciation factor13. When costs
are very low ( c < δ − δ 2 ) the unique pairwise stable network and the unique strongly
efficient network is the complete network. When the costs are intermediate
( δ − δ 2 < c < δ ) the star network is pairwise stable (but not unique) and the unique

11

~
Note that ∀x ≤ d ij + 1, ∀j ∈ N (i, g ) :

∑s

k
ij
~
k∈N (i , g )

(x ) = s ij

and that sijk (x ) > 0 ⇒ ∀x ′ ≠ x : s ijk ( x ′) = 0 .

12

The optimization problem of the individual in this model can be interpreted as some kind of
centrality maximization problem under costs constraint. It departs from the common centrality
measures both by considering linking costs and by using an exogenous depreciation parameter
(although similar concepts of distance depreciation appear in the closeness centrality measure, the
information centrality measure and the attenuation parameter suggested first by Katz (1953) and used
by Bonacich (1987) and many others). This model is very simple and therefore entails some strong
assumptions as centrality maximization (see Shimbel (1953) for reservations), positive externalities
(see the coauthors model in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) for negative externalities) and shortest paths
as the only source of utility (for reservations see Stephenson and Zelen (1989)).
13
See Jackson (2008) for similar results given a more general distance-based benefit function.
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strongly efficient network. When the costs are high ( δ < c < δ +

n−2 2
δ ) the empty
2

network is pairwise stable (each agent in any other pairwise stable network has at
least two links), while the star network is the unique strongly efficient network (but,
obviously, not pairwise stable). Last, when the costs are extremely high
(δ +

n−2 2
δ < c ) the empty network is pairwise stable and the unique strongly
2

efficient network. Later, we will use the fact that nothing in these results changes if
the utility function of the agent is u i (g ) = ∑ Aδ
j ≠i

d ij

−

∑c

for a positive constant A14.

j:ij∈g

Figure 1: Graphical summary of propositions 1 and 2 in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) for the
case of n=10. The X-axis is the depreciation rate ( δ ) and the Y-axis is the linking costs (c).

14

Mathematically, instead of accounting for the linking costs in the various cases of these propositions,

one should refer to the linking costs normalized by the parameter, meaning to
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The heterogeneous symmetric connections model without side payments

We allow for two types of agents in the framework described above, such that there
are k > 0 type a agents and l > 0 type b agents ( k + l = n ). The agent's utility from
each connection is a function both of her proximity to the other agent (as in the
homogeneous model) and of the intrinsic value that this agent provides her15. Thus,
the utility of agent i from network g is u i ( g ) = ∑ δ

d ij

f (t i , t j ) −

j ≠i

∑c

where t i ∈ {a, b}

j:ij∈g

and f (t i , t j ) is the intrinsic value function. We assume that the intrinsic value
function is symmetric, positive and depends only on the types of the agents:

 w1

f (t i , t j ) = w2
w
 3

ti = t j = a
(Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) use w3 = w2 = w1 = 1 ).
ti ≠ t j
ti = t j = b

The intrinsic value function might be interpreted as inducing a social norm regarding
the benefit from connections in the society. In this paper we will concentrate on the
case in which w1 > w2 > w3 . In this case, both types prefer a connection to an agent of
type a over a connection of the same length to an agent of type b16. Therefore, we call
a society with such values of the intrinsic value function a "power based" society
since the agents' preferences could be interpreted as an attraction towards the
powerful17. Note that type a is the preferred type for exogenous reasons, and in
particular, for reasons which are independent from the network structure. For future
use denote wmin = min{w1 , w2 , w3 } and wmax = max{w1 , w2 , w3 }.

Core-periphery

A network g is a core-periphery network if there is a partition of the set of agents into
two subsets K (the "core") and L (the "periphery") such that K ∪ L = N , K ∩ L = φ
and ∀i, j ∈ K : ij ∈ g while ∀i, j ∈ L : ij ∉ g . Various classes of core-periphery
15

This is the term used by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) while describing the general connections
model.
16
Since the function is symmetric one can interpret these weights as strength of ties in the sense of
Granovetter (1973). The highest value reflects both power and homophily, the second reflects only
power and the third reflects only homophily. This interpretation and the results that follow are in line
with the findings of van der Leij and Goyal (2006) regarding the core periphery architecture of
economists' coauthorships, in which strong ties are found to exist mainly between core members.
17
Following Boorman and Levitt (1973) one can interpret "power based" society in a genetic context.
Every individual would like to establish a link with a bearer of better genes in order to increase his
siblings' fitness. However, it is hard to apply it to indirect connections.
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networks can be characterized by the pattern of the direct connections between the
core agents and the periphery agents (see figure 2). For every periphery member,
i ∈ L , define his core as the set M i = { j | j ∈ K , ij ∈ g } and denote its size by

mi = M i . For every core member,

j ∈ K , define his periphery as the set

N j = {i | i ∈ K , ij ∈ g } and denote its size by n j = N j (denote the size of the biggest
periphery by N = max n j and the size of the smallest periphery by N = min n j ). A
j

j

core-periphery network g is disconnected if there are no direct connections between
periphery agents and core agents ( ∀i ∈ L : mi = 0 ). A core-periphery network g is
maximally connected if each periphery agent is directly connected to all core agents

( ∀i ∈ L : mi = K ). Note that if the division of the agents to core agents and periphery
agents is known, the disconnected core-periphery network and the maximally
connected core-periphery network are unique. A core-periphery network g is
minimally connected if each periphery agent is directly connected to exactly one core

agent ( ∀i ∈ L : mi = 1 ). A minimally connected core-periphery network g is one-gate
if all periphery agents are directly connected to the same core agent (the gate) and
only to her ( ∀i ∈ L : mi = 1 and ∀i, j ∈ L : M i = M j )18. If the division of agents to
subsets is known, then the one-gate minimally connected core-periphery network is
unique under the unlabeled set of networks (similar to the star network).

18

For the importance of the exact characterization of the links between heterogeneous groups see
discussion in page 96 of Zeggelink (1995) and especially footnote 11.
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Figure 2: Core-periphery networks (agents A,B,C are the core agents, agents
D,E,F are the periphery agents).

3 Results
Helpful lemma

Define the relative contribution of k ∈ N (i, g ) to the connection between agent i and
agent j in g by RC (i, j , k , g ) ≡

(i, j, k , g ) = δ
∑( RC
)

d ij

s ijk (2 )
s ij

δ

d ij

f (t i , t j ) 19. It is therefore trivial to note that

f (t i , t j ) . Define the total relative contribution of neighbor k

k ∈N i , g

by TRC (i, k , g ) ≡

∑ RC (i, j, k , g ) − c . Note that

~
j∈N (i , g )

TRC (i, k , g ) ≠ TRC (k , i, g ) and that

∑ TRC (i, k , g ) = u (g ) .

k ∈N ( i , g )

i

Lemma 1: If g is pairwise stable then for each pair of agents i and k, such that ik ∈ g ,

TRC (i, k , g ) ≥ 0 .

19

This notion of contribution is intuitively close to the betweeness centrality measure (see Freeman
1982).
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The proof (as all other proofs) is relegated to the appendix. We will use this lemma in
some of the following proofs. One implication of this lemma is that since
ui (g ) =

∑ TRC (i, k , g ) , if g is a pairwise stable network, then all the agents have

k ∈N ( i , g )

non-negative utility20.

Extremely low linking costs

Proposition 1 shows that when the linking costs are extremely low, the complete
network will emerge both as the predicted outcome and as the favorable outcome.
This result is very common in network formation models with positive externalities
and it is independent of the preferences of both types of agents (the ordering of the
values of the intrinsic value function). We might interpret this result as showing that
when the linking costs are very low, the social structure does not reflect the social
heterogeneity.

(

)

Proposition 1: If δ − δ 2 wmin > c the complete network is the unique pairwise stable
network and the unique efficient network.

Low linking costs

These costs are high enough for a direct connection between type b agents not to be
worthwhile if the pair have an alternative length two path between them. However,
these costs are low enough for a direct connection between a type b agent and a type a
agent to be worthwhile even if they have a length two path between them. Proposition
2 shows that, in this case, both the predicted and the socially favorable outcome is the
maximally connected core-periphery network in which type b agents drop their
internal direct connections. Thus, the strength of type a agents is reflected in their
social position, since they are both highly connected and serve as bridges for the type
b agents.
20

In the homogeneous connections model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), this implication can extend
the results stated above since it establishes that empty network is the unique pairwise stable network in
the extremely high costs range ( δ

+

n−2 2
δ < c ). If there is another pairwise stable network in this
2

range, its total value should be non-negative since each of the agents have non-negative utility.
However, the empty network is the unique efficient network, meaning, there is no other network with
non-negative total utility – contradiction.
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(δ − δ )w
2

Proposition 2: If

2

(

)

> c > δ − δ 2 w3 the maximally connected core-

periphery network in which all the core agents are of type a and all the periphery
agents are of type b is the unique pairwise stable network and the unique efficient
network.

Additional assumptions

To analyze the probable and favorable network structures when the linking costs are

(

)

higher than δ − δ 2 w2 we will add one assumption regarding the preferences of the
type a agents and one assumption regarding the preferences of the type b agents.
To demonstrate the need for these additional assumptions assume that agent i have a
shortest path of length l>1 both to a type a agent and to a type b agent. Moreover,
assume that shortening the path to these agents does not shorten any other connection
that agent i possesses. The preferences of agent i suggest that she will prefer to form a
direct link with the type a agent over forming a direct link with the type b agent.
However, if initially her path to the type b agent was longer than her path to the type a
agent, her preferences regarding the direct links formation are unclear. The two new
assumptions are introduced in order to extend the description of the agent's
preferences to include some of these cases.

(
)
Assumption 2: (δ − δ )w > (δ − δ )w .
Assumption 1: δ − δ 2 w1 > δw2 .
2

3

2

3

The first assumption states that type a agent prefers to connect directly to another type
a agent to whom she otherwise has a path of length two over connecting directly to a
type b agent to whom she otherwise has no path at all. The second assumption is
somewhat weaker and it states that type b agent prefers to connect directly to type a
agent to whom she otherwise has a path of length two over connecting directly to a
type b agent to whom she otherwise has a path of length three21. It is important to note
21

Another interpretation of the first assumption can be seen if the inequality is written as
∞

δw1 >

∑δ w
i

2

. Thus, a type a agent prefers to connect directly to a type a agent to whom she

i =1

otherwise have no path at all over connecting directly to a type b agent which is positioned at the
beginning of an infinite line of type b agents to none of whom she otherwise has any path at all. Similar
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that these interpretations to the assumptions refer only to situations in which forming
the link does not yield any shortening of paths to agents other than the agent with
whom the link is formed.
Mathematically, these assumptions restrict the eligible values for the intrinsic values
function and for the depreciation rate parameter, beyond the previous restrictions
( w1 > w2 > w3 and 0 < δ < 1 ). One approach is to interpret the assumptions as an
introduction of an effective upper bound to the depreciation rate parameter. It is trivial
to see that for both assumptions to hold simultaneously, the depreciation rate

 w w

parameter should satisfy 0 < δ < min 1 − 2 , 2 − 1 22. Another approach is to
 w1 w3 
interpret these assumptions as a construction of lower bounds to the cardinal
difference (or ratio) between the agents' utility from a direct connection with a type a
agent and her utility from a direct connection with a type b agent. The small lower
bound set for type b agents compared to the one set for type a agents, might be
interpreted as an addition of a second-order homophily effect. Under this
interpretation, type a agents are attracted to other type a agents both because of their
exogenous power and their mutual similarity. However, type b agents are attracted to
type a agents despite the offsetting effect of their differences.
Stronger version of assumption 2, which is symmetric to assumption 1, states that
type b agent prefers to connect directly to type a agent to whom she otherwise has a
path of length two over connecting directly to a type b agent to whom she otherwise
has no path at all.

Assumption 2*: (δ − δ 2 )w2 > δw3 .

(

)

interpretation to the second assumption arises from writing the inequality as δw2 > δ + δ 2 w3 . Thus, a
type b agent prefers to connect directly to a type a agent to whom she otherwise has no path at all over
connecting directly to a connected pair of type b agents to whom she otherwise has no path.
2w1 w3
22
Given w1 and w3 , the effective restriction is the second assumption iff w2 <
. An increase
w1 + w3
in w2 causes with type a agents to be relatively less attractive for type a agents and relatively more
attractive for type b agents. Therefore, given w1 and w3 , an increase in w2 turns the first assumption
to be the effective restriction. Note that the upper bound can be almost as low as zero (if either
w − w3
2 w1 w3
w2 = w1 or w2 = w3 is approached) and as high as 1
(if w2 =
) which is strictly
w1 + w3
w1 + w3
lower than unity.
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It is again trivial to see that for assumptions 1 and 2* to hold simultaneously, the

 w w

 w
w 
depreciation rate should satisfy 0 < δ < min 1 − 2 ,1 − 3  ≤ min 1 − 2 , 2 − 1 23.
w2 
 w1
 w1 w3 

Medium linking costs

Proposition 3 analyses the linking costs range in which a direct connection between
type a and a type b agents is not worthwhile if they have a length two path between
them, but it is worthwhile if this link is the only path between them. This proposition
asserts that under the assumptions above, the socially favorable outcome is the one
gate minimally connected core periphery network in which the core contains all the
type a agents while the periphery contains all the type b agents. However, the set of
possible networks is much larger and includes two structures of networks. First, all the
minimally connected core periphery networks in which the core contains all the type a
agents while the periphery contains all the type b agents (therefore the favorable
networks are also possible). Second, some of the connected networks in which the
type a agents form a complete clique and there is at least one type b agent who is not
connected directly to a type a agent.

(

)

Proposition 3: If δw2 > c > δ − δ 2 w2 and assumption 1 and 2 hold:
1. Every minimally connected core-periphery network in which all core agents
are of type a and all periphery agents are of type b is pairwise stable.
2. The set of pairwise stable networks includes also some connected networks in
which all type a agents are directly connected to each other and there is at least
one type b agent who is not directly linked to any type a agent.
3. The one-gate minimally connected core-periphery network in which all core
agents are of type a and all periphery agents are of type b is uniquely efficient.

23

Given w1 and w3 , the effective restriction is the second assumption iff when w2 < w1 w3 . Note

2w1 w3
and therefore the interval of values for which the effective restriction is the
w1 + w3
second assumption is wider. Note that the upper bound can be almost as low as low as zero (if either
w3
w2 = w1 or w2 = w3 is approached) and as high as 1 −
(if w2 = w1 w3 ).
w1

that

w1 w3 >
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The first part of the proof establishes that in the medium linking costs range, the
behavior of agents of any minimally connected core-periphery network in which all
core agents are of type a and all periphery agents are of type b follows the following
rules:
•

No pair of core agents wants to severe their link due to assumption 1.

•

No pair of periphery agents likes to form a link due to assumption 2.

•

Core agents maintain their links with their own periphery agents since
otherwise they will have no access to them.

•

Core agents do not form a link to other periphery agents both since they can
access them through other core agents and since they do not provide any
additional value.

In this architecture, type a agents consider other type a agents attractive for two
reasons - the high intrinsic value of their connection and the access to their periphery
agents. As the size of the periphery of the type a agent decreases he becomes less
attractive to his fellow type a agents. Assumption 1 guarantees that even the least
valuable type a agent, one who has no periphery agents of his own, will still be
attractive to other type a agents24.
A pair of periphery agents either shares the same core agent or not. If they share a
core agent the value of their connection is δ 2 w3 while if they have different core
agents the value is only δ 3 w3 . Obviously, the later pair has stronger incentive to form
a direct link. Hence, we need assumption 2 to ensure that a pair of type b agents that
have different core agents does not wish to form a direct link. Note, however, that
one-gate minimally connected core-periphery network in which all core agents are of
type a and all periphery agents are of type b, will remain pairwise stable even if
assumption 2 is dropped since all the periphery agents in this network share the same
core agent.
The second part of the proof characterizes the non core periphery pairwise stable
networks as connected networks in which all type a agents are directly connected and
there is at least one type b agent who is not directly linked to any type a agent. Under

(

)

(

)

l 
Weakening the first assumption to δ − δ 2 w1 +   δ 2 − δ 3 w2 > δw2 narrows the set of pairwise
k 
stable core periphery networks to be the set of minimally connected core periphery networks in which
l 
the core includes only type a agents, the periphery includes only type b agents and N =   . Note that
k 
this discussion is relevant only for k ≥ 3 . When there are one or two type a agents assumption 1 is not
needed.
24
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certain conditions, that satisfy the costs range and assumptions 1 and 2 (but not 2*),
the non core periphery network in figure 3A is pairwise stable. If assumption 2 is
replaced by the stricter assumption 2*, we can further establish that the type b agents
who are not directly linked to any type a agent have to posses at least two links.
Under certain conditions, that satisfy the costs range and assumptions 1 and 2* (and
therefore also 2), the non core periphery network in figure 3B is pairwise stable.

Figure 3A: non core periphery network
which is pairwise stable under certain
conditions that satisfy assumptions 1 and
2 (not 2*). (black – type a, white – type b).

The third part of the proof shows that

Figure 3B: non core periphery network
which is pairwise stable under certain
conditions that satisfy assumptions 1 and
2* (and therefore also 2). (black – type a,
thewhite
one-gate
minimally connected core– type b).

periphery network in which all core agents are of type a and all periphery agents are
of type b is uniquely efficient. The short distance between the type b agents provides
the intuition for the efficiency of the one-gate network in comparison to other
minimally connected core periphery networks. The one gate network could be
considered as a mixture of a complete network of the type a agents and a star network
of the type b agents (centered by a type a agent). The efficiency of this mixture is not
surprising considering proposition 1 of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). Note that this
part of the proof does not use assumption 2 (assumption 1 is needed for the efficiency
of the type a agents' organization). However, the one gate network is not efficient in
the Paretian sense since the gate agent is better off in any other minimally connected
core periphery network, since a direct connection between type a and a type b agents
is not worthwhile if they have a length two path between them.
Proposition 3 exhibits the first case of tension between probable and favorable
networks. Although this tension can be mitigated by a central planner, since the
favorable network is also probable, it demonstrates clearly two distinct sources of
inefficiency. One source of inefficiency is non optimal positioning, meaning that
some agents have "wrong" friends. The other source of inefficiency is non optimal
connectivity, meaning that some agents have "too many" friends. The first source is
demonstrated by the stable and inefficient minimally connected core periphery
networks. In these networks the inefficiency is a result of lack of coordination
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between agents in designating the gate agent. The second source of inefficiency is
best demonstrated by the set of non core periphery networks under assumptions 1 and
2*. First note that efficient network has

k (k − 1)
internal core links and l links in
2

which the type b agents are involved (their links to the gate). The number of links in
the non core periphery stable networks is strictly higher since they have the same
number of internal core links but more than l links in which type b agents are involved
because agents who are not connected to the core cannot be "loose ends". Thus, in
these stable networks another source of inefficiency is non optimal connectivity, the
agents are over-connected25.

25

Under assumption 2, not all of these networks are over connected, see figure 3A.
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Additional definition

An additional definition is needed before analyzing the structures emerging in
environments with higher levels of linking costs ( c > δw2 ). Let g be a one gate
minimally connected core-periphery network in which all core agents are of type a
and all periphery agents are of type b and let g ′ be the disconnected core-periphery
network in which all core agents are of type a and all periphery agents are of type b.
Note that the number of links in g is the number of links in g ′ plus the number of
type b agents (l). Thus, the number of additional payments for direct connections in g,
relative to g ′ is 2l. Denote by Q the additional utility from g per additional payment Q = δw2 + δ 2 w2 (k − 1) + δ 2 w3

(l − 1) − c .
2

Intuitively, Q is the net social return from connecting all type b agents into the central
component of the network. If Q > 0 it is beneficial for the whole society to
incorporate the weak agents into the central component and otherwise it is not26. This
social consideration is not in direct accordance with the individual preferences of the
agents over the formation of these links. Therefore, Q will serve as useful
methodological tool in analyzing the tension between stability and efficiency that will
arise in the following results. Moreover, Q is an increasing function of the network
size and therefore this characteristic of the network, which had almost no role in the
lower linking costs, is expected to have a direct effect on the range of linking costs in
which the stability-efficiency tension exists27.

High linking costs

Proposition 4 analyses the linking costs range in which a direct connection between
type a and a type b agents is not worthwhile even if this link is the only path between
them while a direct connection between a pair of type a agents is worthwhile even if
otherwise they have a path of length two between them. Assumption 1 guarantees that
this range exists. It should also be noted that if n ≥ 3 this range surely contains an
interval in which Q > 0 but it may also contain a higher interval in which Q < 0 .

This consideration was irrelevant for smaller linking costs since Q > δw2 − c and therefore always
positive. Thus, it was always beneficial to incorporate the weak agents into the society.
27
The size of the network had similar effect in the high linking costs range of the homogeneous model.
See propositions 1.2 and 2.4 in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
26

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2009

19

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 303 [2009]

20
The proposition shows that the characterization of the favorable and probable
networks depend heavily on the value of Q. If Q < 0 (proposition 4.1) the
disconnected core-periphery network in which all core agents are of type a and all
periphery agents are of type b is the unique pairwise stable network and the unique
efficient network. Thus, when Q < 0 there is no tension between stability and
efficiency. However, if Q > 0 (proposition 4.2) the tension exists and it cannot be
mitigated by a central planner. The socially favorable outcome in this case is, as in the
medium linking costs range, the one gate minimally connected core periphery
network in which the core contains all the type a agents while the periphery contains
all the type b agents. The set of probable networks, on the other hand, includes the
disconnected core-periphery network in which all core agents are of type a and all
periphery agents are of type b and some other, non core-periphery networks. This
result, that the favorable network is not probable, resembles the one found by Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996) in the homogeneous model for the range δ < c < δ +

Proposition 4.1: If

(δ − δ )w
2

1

n−2 2
δ .
2

> c > δw2 , Q < 0 and assumption 1 holds, the

disconnected core-periphery network in which all core agents are of type a and all
periphery agents are of type b is the unique pairwise stable network and the unique
efficient network.

(

)

Proposition 4.2: If δ − δ 2 w1 > c > δw2 , Q > 0 and assumption 1 holds:
1. The disconnected core-periphery network in which all core agents are of type
a and all periphery agents are of type b is pairwise stable.
2. The other members of the set of pairwise stable networks are non core
periphery networks in which all type a agents are directly connected to each
other and every type b agent is either isolated or possesses at least two links28.
3. The one-gate minimally connected core-periphery network in which all core
agents are of type a and all periphery agents are of type b is uniquely efficient.

28

A conjecture we fail to prove or refute is that if assumption 2 holds then the disconnected coreperiphery network in which all core agents are of type a and all periphery agents are of type b is the
unique pairwise stable network. Note that besides this conjecture, assumption 2 is unneeded to get the
results stated in proposition 4.
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Proposition 4 is divided only for presentational convenience, the proofs of these
propositions are combined and relegated to the appendix.
The first part of the proof shows that when the linking costs are high, type a agents in
the disconnected core-periphery network in which all core agents are of type a and all
periphery agents are of type b, do not wish to severe their links with each other but are
not willing to form links with the completely isolated type b agents. The reluctance of
type a agents to form links with type b agents does not stem only from the low value
they give to this kind of direct connection, but also from the fact that the type b agents
do not provide any "extra" value of short paths to third parties. However, this
additional requirement of "extra" value is not demanded when a link between two
type a agents is considered, since this link bears a high enough intrinsic value to
overcome the linking costs.
The second part of the proof shows the efficiency of the disconnected core-periphery
network (proposition 4.1) and the one-gate core periphery network (proposition 4.2).
The proof technique is very similar to the efficiency proof of proposition 3. However,
the differences are due to the behavior of the type a agents who no longer wish to
form links with isolated type b agents, and therefore the possibility of an efficient
network which is not connected. The final step of this part was to use Q to
characterize the cases in which the disconnected core-periphery network has higher
total utility than the one-gate core periphery network and vice versa.
The third part of the proof completes proposition 4.1 by establishing the uniqueness of
the disconnected core-periphery network in which all core agents are of type a and all
periphery agents are of type b. Briefly, we show that every pairwise stable network
have to contain a complete clique of all type a agents. Thus, any other pairwise stable
network must have additional links relative to the disconnected core-periphery
network. By lemma 1 its total utility should be higher, contradicting the efficiency
result.
The last part of the proof characterize, for the case of Q > 0 , the set of pairwise stable
networks other than the disconnected core periphery network. It is easily shown that
these networks are non core periphery networks in which all type a agents are directly
connected to each other and every type b agent is either isolated or possesses at least
two links. We show that under values that do not satisfy assumption 2, the first case
can be demonstrated by a network with two connected type a agents and a separate
circle of eleven type b agents while the second case can be demonstrated by network
pictured in figure 4.
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Figure 4: non core periphery network which is
pairwise stable under certain conditions that do
not satisfy assumption 2. Every type b agent has
at least two links (black – type a, white – type b).

The main characteristic of this range is that the linking costs are too high for any type
a agent to invest in a connection with an otherwise isolated type b agent. Obviously, if
this investment is too high for a type a agent, it is also too high for a type b agent.
Therefore, all the probable networks have either isolated type b agents or type b
agents that are directly connected to at least two different agents.
The additional utility per additional payment, denoted by Q, is a general measure that
has an interesting role in the results of proposition 4. While it is trivial, by definition,
that its sign sets the efficient network, it is rather surprising that its sign also have
some relation to individual incentives since it distinguish between parameter values
for which there are pairwise stable non disconnected core periphery networks and
cases in which the disconnected core periphery network is the unique stable network.
As a result, Q serves as indicator to the tension between favorable and stable networks
which exists only if Q > 0 . However, the tension in this case is worth than in all
previous cases since the favorable one gate core periphery network is not stable since
its type b agents are not attractive enough for the potential gate agent. As mentioned
above, this result resembles the one found by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) in the
homogeneous model for stars in the range δ < c < δ +

n−2 2
δ .
2

Extremely high linking costs

Proposition 5 analyses the linking costs range in which a direct connection between a
pair of type a agents is not worthwhile if they have an alternative path of length two
between them. The proposition shows that in this range, if assumption 1 holds, core
periphery networks are neither pairwise stable nor efficient. The basic intuition behind
this result is that in this linking costs range, the clique architecture is too costly for the
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type a agents. Indeed, although it would not be proven here due to lack of interest,
various architectures that feature a star for the type a agents emerge as pairwise stable
and efficient in this range of linking costs.

(

)

Proposition 5: If c > δ − δ 2 w1 , k ≥ 3 and assumption 1 holds, no core periphery
network in which all the core agents are of type a and all the periphery agents are of
type b is either pairwise stable or efficient.

The instability result is fairly obvious. Already, in proposition 4 we saw that if the
linking costs are too high for a type a agent to connect to an otherwise isolated type b
agent, the disconnected core periphery network in which all the core agents are of
type a and all the periphery agents are of type b is the only core periphery candidate
for pairwise stability. In the present level of linking costs, this network is not stable
since it is too high for the a type a agent to maintain connections to all the other
agents considering he has an alternative path of length two to each of them if k ≥ 3 .
Note that assumption 1 is crucial for the correctness of this part of the proposition. If
it does not hold and c > δw2 , pairwise stable core periphery networks might emerge
(numerical example is provided in the proof). The intuition is that the linking costs do
not prevent type a agents from connecting to an otherwise isolated type b agents. By
maintaining this kind of connections the type a agents become more attractive to other
type a agents since a link with them provides additional shorter paths to their
peripheral type b agents. If all the type a agents increase their attractiveness by
connecting to otherwise isolated type b agents, it might be worthwhile for all the
internal connections in the core to be kept and stability to be achieved.
In order to show that core periphery network in which all the core agents are of type a
and all the periphery agents are of type b are inefficient, we began by showing that an
efficient core-periphery network should minimize the paths between peripheral type b
agents. Then any network in which there was a type b agent with more than one link
was shown to be inefficient. The last step was to show that the rest of the core
periphery networks, where all the non isolated periphery agents are linked to the same
type a agent (the gate) are inefficient. Indeed, a non core periphery architecture in
which all the type a agents and the non isolated type b agents are organized as a star
around the gate is shown to have higher total utility. Note that assumption 1 was not
needed for this part of the proof.
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4 Conclusions

In this paper we introduced the heterogenuous connections model in which there are
two types of agents whose their benefit from their connections to other agents depends
on their geodesic distance and on their types. The dependence of the benefit on the
types is modeled using a discrete, positive and symmetric intrinsic value function that
multiply the original depreciation factor of the homogeneous connections model of
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
In the case analyzed here both types have the same ordinal preferences over
connections, holding the path length constant and provided that no indirect benefits
are incurred due to shortening paths to other agents. This setting is interpreted as a
"power based" society, where the powerful type is the type preferred by both agents.
We show that in this simple framework, the dominant architecture when linking costs
are not too low and not too high is the core periphery architecture where the powerful
type agents are positioned in the completely connected core while the other type is
peripheral and is completely disconnected internally. Various versions of this
architecture appear as pairwise stable networks (in some cases the unique stable
network) and as efficient networks (always unique).
We suggest heterogeneity and "power indicating preferences" as an alternative
explanation for the circumstances under which a core periphery network might
emerge. Thus, after the formation of the network, the core agents have two distinct
sources of power. The first source is the high intrinsic value that all the members of
the society have from connecting to them. This power is exogenous and independent
of the network formation process. The second source of power is the central position
of the preferred type in the social network. This secondary power which is easily
observed through the network structure is both the manifestation of the original power
and its perpetuator.
The framework used in this paper, and specifically the intrinsic value function enables
the analysis of two other types of heterogenuous social preferences. While we
assumed w1 > w2 > w3 to characterize the "power based" society, assuming that
w1 , w3 > w2 might be interpreted as a "homophilic" society in which both types of
agents prefer to connect to their own type over connecting to the other type. Assuming
w2 > w1 , w3 might be interpreted as a "heterophilic" society in which both types of
agents prefer to connect to the other type over connecting to their own type.
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It is intuitive to predict that the dominant structure in the "homophilic" society is the
segregated network in which there are two cohesive groups densely connected
internally, one of type a agents and the other of type b agents29. However, it seems
that it takes very high linking costs in order to achieve complete segregation, meaning
that the two groups form two separate components, since the benefit from a
connection between these groups is huge30. This result is consistent, obviously, with
Burt (1992) identification of structural holes and the massive gains that they carry.
These basic intuitions are backed by an overwhelming amount of empirical evidence
that was gathered regarding the dominance of segregated networks in which each
component is internally homogeneous under homophilic social preferences31.
It is also intuitive to predict that the dominant structure in the "heterophilic" society is
the bipartite network which consists of two cohesive groups sparsely connected
internally and densely connected externally32. One observation is that the lack of
internal connections will lead to high average degree in this environment33. The main
line of research that analyses bipartite structures is the analysis of matching
procedures, which is fairly different from the formation literature by its mechanistic
approach and the lack of network perspective in the agents' utilities. It seems that the
empirical literature regarding the network perspective of bipartite structures and
heterophily barely exists34.
We will conclude with the observation that compared with core periphery networks in
the empirical literature, the networks that emerged in this analysis were "too neat".
Moreover, the change in the stable architecture during an increase of the linking costs
wasn't continuous. However, we believe that this is due to the simplicity of the model

29

Informally, it seems that the internal structure of each of the cohesive groups is either a complete
network or a star, depending on the linking costs, as predicted in the homogeneous model of Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996).
30
Similar intuition can be deduced from proposition 2 of Jackson and Rogers (2005).
31
For representative results regarding homophily in social networks see Precker (1952), Gurevitch
(1961), Travers and Milgram (1969), White et. al. (1976), Verbrugge (1977), Brieger and Ennis (1979),
Frank (1995) and McPherson et. al. (2001). There is also a vast theoretical literature concerning
segregation, in particular due to the tendencies towards economic segregation in both the US and
Europe since the 1970's (i.e. Miyao (1978), Benabou (1993, 1996a, 1996b), Durlauf (1996)).
32
Some cases of the coauthor model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) generate bipartite networks as an
efficient (yet not stable) outcomes. However, these networks are not densely connected between the
two sets of agents.
33
Let agent i be a type a agent and let agent j be a type b agent. If they are not directly connected, they
will probably have only a path of length three between them since most of i's neighbors will be type b
agents who are sparsely connected to agent j, and the same for agent j. Thus, the net gain from direct
connection is higher in this framework and therefore a high average degree is predicted.
34
Krackhardt and Hanson (1993) mention segregation, core-periphery and bipartite structures as
undesirable architectures of organizational networks. However they do not discuss the normative
causes for the formation of these architectures.
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and introducing more complex mathematical objects as non linear linking costs or
secondary stochastic formation processes will yield these deviations with no
substantial important lessons about the formation behavior of the agents.
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Appendix
Proof of lemma 1
We will show that if g is pairwise stable then for each pair of agents i and k, such that

ik ∈ g , it must

TRC (i, k , g ) ≥ 0 . Assume that g is pairwise stable and that there is a pair of agents i and k,
~
k
such that ik ∈ g and TRC (i, k , g ) < 0 . Let l ∈ N (i, g ) . First, if sil (2 ) = 0 then none of the

be that

S (i, l , g ) = S (i, l , g − ik )
k
and ∀j ∈ N (i, g − ik ) : RC (i, l , j , g − ik ) = RC (i, l , j , g ) . Second, if sil (2 ) = s il then all the
shortest paths between agent i and agent l in g pass through agent k. Thus,

shortest paths between agent i and agent l in g pass through agent k. In network g-ik, agent i and agent l
are
either
connected
or
disconnected.
If
they
are
disconnected
then
∀j ∈ N (i, g − ik ) : RC (i, l , j , g − ik ) = RC (i, l , j , g ) = 0 . If they are connected then

∃j ∈ N (i, g − ik ) : RC (i, l , j , g − ik ) > RC (i, l , j , g ) = 0 and there might be other neighbors
k
such that RC (i, l , j , g − ik ) = RC (i, l , j , g ) = 0 . Last, if sil > s il (2 ) > 0 then some of the

shortest paths between agent i and agent l pass through agent k and others through other neighbors. Let

m1 be one of those neighbors. In g-ik, silm1 (2) is the same as in g and sil decreases and
therefore RC (i, l , m1 , g − ik ) > RC (i, l , m1 , g ) . Let agent m 2 be one of the neighbors through
agent

which no shortest path between agent i and agent l go (such agent not necessarily exists). Hence,
RC (i, l , m2 , g − ik ) = RC (i, l , m2 , g ) = 0 . Thus, when the link between agent i and agent k is
severed, the relative contributions of i's other neighbors are non-decreasing and by the definition of
total
relative
contribution,
stated
above,
it
is
clear
that
∀j ∈ N (i, g − ik ) : TRC (i, j , g − ik ) ≥ TRC (i, j , g ) .
Thus,

TRC (i, j , g − ik ) .
∑ TRC (i, j, g ) ≤ ∑
(
)

j∈N (i , g )\ k

Since

TRC (i, k , g ) < 0

we

get

that

j∈N i , g − ik

TRC (i, j , g − ik ) .
∑ TRC (i, j, g ) < ∑
(
)

j∈N (i , g )

However, this means that

u i ( g ) < u i ( g − ik ) .

j∈N i , g −ik

Therefore, it is beneficial for agent i to drop his link to agent k and therefore g is not pairwise stable.
Contradiction. Thus, if g is pairwise stable then for each pair of agents i and k, such that ik ∈ g ,

TRC (i, k , g ) ≥ 0 .

Proof of proposition 1

n > 2 . The net gains of
2
agent i from keeping the direct connection ij are at least δwmin − c − δ wmin . Since

To show that the complete network is pairwise stable first consider the case of

(δ − δ )w
2

min

> c , the net gains are positive and both agents will keep the link. In the case of n = 2 ,

both agents are completely isolated after severing ij and therefore their net gains from keeping the link
are at least δwmin − c . Since δwmin > c , the net gains are again positive and both agents will keep
the link. Thus, the complete network is pairwise stable. To prove that the complete network is the
unique stable network, assume that there is another stable network, g ′ . There is at least one pair of
agents that are not directly linked in g ′ . Assume that a path of length two links them. As shown above,
their net gains from connecting directly, whatever are their types, are positive and therefore this
network is not stable. Obviously, if a longer path links them (as in the case of n = 2 ), they will also
prefer to connect directly. Thus, the unique stable network is the complete network. To prove that the
complete network is the unique efficient network, first consider the case of n > 2 and let g ′ be a
non-complete network. There exists in
Consider the network

g ′ a pair of agents i and j which are not directly connected.

g ′′ = g ′ + ij . The minimal difference in total utility between the two networks
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is achieved when every other agent
are only two links away in

h ≠ i, j have the same utility in g ′′ as in g ′ 35 , the two agents

g ′ and when the internal value of their connection is the lowest possible

(

)

2 δwmin − c − δ 2 wmin . As shown above, this
difference is positive and therefore g ′ is not efficient. If n = 2 the only non-complete network is the

one. Thus, the minimal difference in total utility is

empty network, in which the total utility is zero. Thus, the difference in total utility between the
complete network and the empty network is at least 2(δwmin − c ) and as showed above this
difference is positive. In conclusion, for any non-complete network

g ′ in which agents i and j are not

directly connected, the network g ′′ = g ′ + ij has higher total utility. Thus, the complete network
achieves the highest total utility and therefore it is strongly and uniquely efficient.
Proof of proposition 2
Let g be the "maximally connected" core-periphery network in which all the core agents are of type a
and all the periphery agents are of type b. We will prove that g is pairwise stable by showing that no
pair of periphery agents wishes to form a direct link, no core agent wishes to severe her direct links to
either the core or the periphery agents and no periphery agent wishes to severe her direct links to the
core agents. In order to show that no pair of periphery agents wish to form a direct link, note that these

k (δw2 − c ) + (l − 1)δ 2 w3 . If there is more than
one periphery agent (otherwise this case is irrelevant), the utility of a periphery agent i in g + ij where

agents are of type b and that their utility from g is

j is a periphery agent is

(

)

k (δw2 − c ) + (l − 2 )δ 2 w3 + (δw3 − c ) . Thus, since c > δ − δ 2 w3 , no

periphery agent in g wishes to form a direct link with another periphery agent. In order to show that no
core agent wishes to severe a direct link with another core agent, note that these agents are of type a
and that their utility in g is (k − 1)(δw1 − c ) + l (δw2 − c ) . If there are more than one core agent
(otherwise this case is irrelevant), the utility of a core agent i in

(k − 2 )(δw1 − c ) + δ

2

g − ij where j is a core agent is

w1 + l (δw2 − c ) as they will have a path of length two through a third party

(

)

(either core agent or periphery agent). Thus, the link would be kept since δ − δ w1 > c . In order to
show that no core agent wishes to severe a direct link with a periphery agent consider first the case in
which there is more than one core agent. If a core agent i decides to sever a direct link with a periphery
agent j, it has no effect on the length of her paths to the rest of the agents in g − ij . The new path to
2

agent j will be of length two (through another core agent). The utility of the core agent in

(k − 1)(δw1 − c ) + (l − 1)(δw2 − c ) + δ

(

)

g − ij is

w2 and she will keep the link since δ − δ w2 > c . If
there is only one core agent, her utility from g is l (δw2 − c ) while her utility from g − ij is
(l − 1)(δw2 − c ) and she will keep the link since δw2 > c . In order to show that no periphery agent
2

2

wishes to severe a direct link with a core agent consider first the case in which there are more than one
core agent. If a periphery agent i decides to sever a direct link with a core agent j, it has no effect on the
length of her paths to the rest of the agents in g − ij . The new path to agent j will be of length two
since (through another core agent). The utility of the periphery agent from

(k − 1)(δw2 − c ) + δ

2

(

is only one core agent, the utility of a periphery agent from g is
utility from

)

g − ij is

w2 + (l − 1)δ w3 and she will keep the link since δ − δ w2 > c . If there
2

2

(δw2 − c ) + (l − 1)δ 2 w3

while her

g − ij is zero. Since δw2 + (l − 1)δ w3 ≥ δw2 > c , she will keep the link. In
2

conclusion, we showed that g, the maximally connected core-periphery network in which all the core
agents are of type a and all the periphery agents are of type b is pairwise stable. To prove that this
35

Note that in the connections model the externality of two players connecting on the other members
of the network is non-negative. The new link might not change any shortest paths in the network
(except of the one between the two connecting agents) or replace certain paths by shorter paths. In both
cases, the utility of the members of the network, apart from the two that establish the new link, is nondecreasing. Deleting a link, on the other hand, might harm agents that are not involved directly in the
severed link since it might lengthen some of their shortest paths. Thus, if two agents wish to add a link
it will surely increase the total utility of the network, while if an agent whishes to severe a link it
improves her utility but might harm total utility.
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network is the unique pairwise stable network we will first show that in any pairwise stable network all
the pairs of type a agents are directly connected. Let g ′ be a pairwise stable network in which there is
a pair of type a agents who are not directly connected (if there is only one type a agent this case is
irrelevant). Their minimal gain from linking is achieved if a path of length two links them and if this
direct link does not shorten any of their paths to other agents. Thus, their gains from the direct link are
at least

δw1 − c − δ 2 w1 > 0 . Obviously, if a longer path links them and/or this

link shortens their

paths to other agents, they will surely gain even more from a direct link and therefore g ′ is not stable,
contradiction. Now we will show that in any pairwise stable network all the pairs of type a agent and
type b agent are directly connected. Let g ′′ be a pairwise stable network in which there is a pair of
type a agent and type b agent who are not directly connected while all the pairs of type a agents are
directly connected. Their minimal gain from linking is achieved if a path of length two links them and
if this direct link does not shorten any of their paths to other agents. Thus, their gains from this direct
link are at least

δw2 − c − δ 2 w2 > 0 . Obviously, if a longer path links them and/or this link shortens

their paths to other agents, they will gain even more from a direct link and therefore g ′′ is not pairwise
stable, contradiction. So far we have shown that every pairwise stable network has at least all the edges
of the maximally connected core-periphery network in which all the core agents are of type a and all
the periphery agents are of type b. If there is only one type b agent there are no other networks with
these edges (in fact it is the complete network) and it is the unique pairwise stable network. If there is
more than one type b agent, we will show that every network which has these links but also some more
links between type b agents is not pairwise stable. Let g ′′′ be a stable network in which every pair of
type a agents are directly connected and every pair of type a agent and type b agent are directly
connected and there is at least one pair of type b agents which are directly connected. In g ′′′ the path
length between two type b agents is two if they are not directly connected or one if they are directly
connected. Moreover, severing a direct link between two type b agents i and j will not affect the paths
between those two agents and other agents in the network. Thus, the net utility gains of each type b
agent's utility from severing the direct link to another type b agent are

(

)

δ 2 w3 − (δw3 − c ) .

Since

c > δ − δ w3 she would wish to severe her direct link to the other type b agent and therefore g ′′′
2

is not pairwise stable, contradiction. Therefore, the maximally connected core-periphery network in
which all the core agents are of type a and all the periphery agents are of type b is the unique pairwise
stable network. To prove that this network is the unique efficient network, let g be a network in which
there exist a pair of agents i and j, at least one of them is a type a agent, which are not linked. Consider
the network g ′ = g + ij . Remember that the externality of two players connecting on the other
members of the network is non-negative and therefore if both agents i and j wish to link directly to each
other the total utility of g ′ must be higher than the total utility of g. We showed above that two type a
agents always wish to connect directly and so do a pair of type a agent and type b agent. Thus, the
efficient network belongs to the set of networks in which type a agents are completely connected while
type b agents are connected to all type a agents and maybe to some of the other type b agents. In these
networks, the shortest path from a type a agent to any other agent is of length one, and the shortest path
between two type b agents is one if they are directly connected and two otherwise. Thus, severing a
link between two type b agents harms the utility of none of the agents that are not involved in the link.
Since

(δ − δ )w
2

3

< c any pair of type b agents increase total utility by severing the link. Hence, the

highest utility will be achieved if there will be no links between type b agents. Thus, the unique
efficient network is the maximally connected core-periphery network in which all the core agents are of
type a and all the periphery agents are of type b.
Proof of proposition 3
Let g be a member of the set of minimally connected core-periphery networks in which all core agents
are of type a and all periphery agents are of type b. In order to show that g is pairwise stable we have to
verify four conditions: no pair of periphery agents would like to connect, no pair of core agent and
periphery agent which is connected to another core agent would like to connect, no pair of core agent
and one of her periphery agents would like to severe their direct link and no pair of core agents would
like to severe their direct links. First, we will show that no pair of periphery agents would like to form a
link (if there is only one periphery agent this case is irrelevant). Note that there are two kinds of pairs
of periphery agents – a pair in which both agents are connected to the same core agent and a pair in
which the agents are connected to different core agents. Consider the case in which both periphery
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agents are connected to the same core agent. If these two periphery agents form a link, it reduces the
distance between them but does not get them closer to any other agent. By forming this link, each of
these agents gains a net utility of

δw3 − c − δ 2 w3 . Thus, since c > (δ − δ 2 )w2 > (δ − δ 2 )w3

this

pair of agents would not wish to connect directly. Now, consider the case in which the two periphery
agents are connected to different core agents (if there is only one core agent this case is irrelevant). If
these two periphery agents form a link, it reduces only the distance between them. By forming this link,
each of these periphery agents has a net utility of

(

)

(

)

δw3 − c − δ 3 w3 .

Thus, using assumption 2,

c > δ − δ w2 > δ − δ w3 and this pair of agents would not wish to connect directly. Second,
2

3

we will show that no pair of core agent

( j2 )

( j1 )

and periphery agent

(i ) who is linked to another core

j1 , i shortens her path to j1 and to her
periphery. On the other hand, j1 only shortens her path to i. Since the gains of j1 from such a direct
link are lower (the intrinsic values are positive and symmetric), she decides whether the link ij1 will
2
form36. Since originally j1 has a path of length two to i, she will object as long as c > (δ − δ )w2 .
agent

would like to form a direct link. If i links to

Therefore, no pair of core agent and periphery agent who is linked to another core agent would like to
form a direct link. Third, we will show that no pair of core agent and one of her periphery agents would
like to severe their mutual link. The core agent will not severe the link since by severing it she loses
δw2 − c and δw2 > c . The net utility of the periphery agent from this link is at least as high as that
of the core agent since she gets all her indirect connections through this link. Therefore, she will keep
the link as well. Last, we will show that no pair of core agents would like to severe their mutual link
(irrelevant if there is one core agent). If there are only two core agents in the network, i and j, severing
the link between them will turn the network into two disconnected stars. In this case, the net utility
gains to agent i from deleting the link are
since

δw1 + δ 2 N j w2 ≥ δw1 > δw2 > c .

(

)

c − δw1 + δ 2 N j w2 . Therefore, she will keep the link
If there are more than two core agents in the network,

agent i's net utility gains from severing the link are

δ 2 w1 + δ 3 N j w2 + c − (δw1 + δ 2 N j w2 ) (her

direct contact with agent j becomes a length two path, and her length two paths to j's periphery become
length three paths). Using assumption 1,

(δ − δ )w + (δ
2

1

2

)

(

)

− δ 3 N j w2 ≥ δ − δ 2 w1 > δw2 > c ,

we get that both core agents will keep the direct link. Thus, we showed that any minimally connected
core-periphery network in which all the core agents are of type a and all the periphery agents are of
type b, is pairwise stable.
However, there are networks that are pairwise stable and do not belong to the set of minimally
connected core-periphery networks in which all core agents are of type a and all periphery agents are of
type b.
The first example is pairwise stable under assumption 2 and not pairwise
stable under assumption 2*. Consider the following network where the
black circles stand for type a agents and white circles stand for type b
agents.
One
can
verify
that
under
the
values

c=

11
3
1
, δ = , w1 = 5, w2 = 1, w3 = , which satisfy the range and
32
4
2

assumptions 1 and 2 and does not satisfy assumption 2*, this non-coreperiphery network is pairwise stable. If the linking costs were higher than
δw3 , assumption 2* was satisfied but the network was not pairwise
stable since the connection between the two type b agents would be
dropped by the agent connected to the core.
The second example is pairwise stable under both assumptions 2 and 2*.
Consider the following network where the black circles stand for type a
agents and white circles stand for type b agents. One can verify that under
the values

c = 1, δ =

1
1
1
, w1 = 10, w2 = 3 , w3 = 1 , which satisfy
2
2
2

the range and assumptions 1, 2 and 2*, this non-core-periphery network
is pairwise stable.
36

This observation is a specific case of the "principle of least interest" that states that the party least
interested in a relationship determine the intensity of interaction (see Waller and Hill (1951)).

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper303

30

Persitz: Power in the Heterogeneous Connections Model: The Emergence

31
In both examples, if the type b agent who is not connected to the core, will severe all his links and will
form a link with one of the type a agents, the resulting minimally connected core periphery network
will be pairwise stable. However, it will not Pareto dominate the original network since the type a
agent with whom the periphery agent formed the link suffers a loss of utility, because in this range of
linking costs, a direct connection between type a and a type b agents is not worthwhile if they have a
length two path between them and it does not shorten any of his other paths.
Now, we will characterize the set of pairwise stable networks which are not minimally connected coreperiphery networks under assumptions 1 and 2. We will show first, that each pair of type a agent are
directly connected in g. Let g ′ be a network in which there is a pair of type a agents who are not
directly connected. In order to examine the minimal contribution of a direct link to these agents'
utilities, assume that a path of length two links them and that connecting them directly does not shorten
any of their other connections. Their net utility gains from a direct connection are

(

)

δw1 − c − δ 2 w1 .

By assumption 1, δ − δ w1 > δw2 > c and therefore it will surely be beneficial for these agents to
connect directly, let alone if a longer path links them and/or if the new link shortens their connections
to other agents. Thus, g ′ is not pairwise stable, and the set of pairwise stable networks is a subset of
the set of all networks in which each pair of type a agents is directly connected. Next we will show that
a pairwise stable network must be connected. Let g ′′ be a network in which each pair of type a agents
are directly connected and there is a pair of agents with no path between them. One component of this
network includes at least all the type a agents while all the other components include only type b
agents. Since δw2 > c it is beneficial for any pair of type a agent and type b agent who do not share
the same component to connect, even if they supply each other with no indirect shorter paths to other
agents. Thus, g ′′ is not pairwise stable, and the set of pairwise stable networks is a subset of the set of
2

all connected networks in which each pair of type a agents is directly connected. Next, let g ′′′ be a
connected network in which each pair of type a agents is directly connected, each type b agent is
directly connected to at least one type a agent and there is at least one type b agent (agent i) which is
directly connected to more than one type a agent (agents j1 , j 2 , K , j k ). Note that agent j1 has a path
of length two to agent i through agent j 2 and that none of her shortest paths pass through this agent
(every type b agent is at least directly connected to one type a agent). Therefore her net gains from
severing its link to agent i are

δ 2 w2 − (δw2 − c ) . Thus, since c > (δ − δ 2 )w2 , j1

would like to

severe her direct link to agent i and g ′′′ is not pairwise stable. In conclusion, a pairwise stable network
must be a connected network such that each pair of type a agents is directly connected. Moreover, there
are two possible patterns of connections between the type a and type b agents – either each type b agent
is directly connected to exactly one type a agent or there is at least one type b agent who is not directly
connected to any type a agent. Regarding the first pattern, it is left to be shown that in any such
pairwise stable network there are no direct connections between type b agents. Note that there are two
kinds of pairs of type b agents – a pair in which both agents are connected to the same type a agent and
a pair in which the agents are connected to different core agents. Consider the case in which both type b
agents are connected to the same type a agent. Keeping a direct link provides net utility gains of

δw3 − c − δ 2 w3

(

)

c > δ − δ 2 w3 this pair of agents would prefer to sever the link.

and since

Consider the case in which each of the two agents is connected to a different type a agent. Keeping the
link

(

provides

)

net

(

utility

)

gains

of

δw3 − c − δ 3 w3 .

Using

assumption

2,

c > δ − δ w2 > δ − δ w3 , ensures that this pair of agents would prefer to sever the link. Thus,
2

3

if g is pairwise stable of the first pattern it must be a minimally connected core-periphery networks in
which all core agents are of type a and all periphery agents are of type b. The pairwise stable networks
of the second pattern are connected networks in which each pair of type a agents is directly connected
and there is at least one type b agent who is not directly connected to any type a agent. Replacing
assumption 2 by assumption 2* forces these type b agents who are not directly connected to any type a
agent to have at least two links. Otherwise, they have one link (the network is connected) and the net
utility gain of the agent that they are linked to, from severing this link is c − δw3 . By assumption 2*
this gain is positive and therefore under assumptions 1 and 2* the set of non-core-periphery networks is
the set of connected networks in which each pair of type a agents is directly connected, there is at least
one type b agent who is not directly connected to any type a agent and each one of these agents has at
least two links. The two examples above demonstrate exactly this point.
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Now we will prove that the set of efficient networks is the set of one-gate minimally connected coreperiphery networks in which all core agents are of type a and all periphery agents are of type b. Let
g be a network in which there exists a pair of agents i and j, both of them are type a agents, which are
not linked. Consider the network g ′ = g + ij . The minimal difference in total utility will be the
differences in these two agents' utilities assuming that they have a path of length two between them in g
and that the new link does not improve any other shortest path in the network (see footnote 35). Thus,
the minimal difference for both agents is

(δ − δ )w

(

)

2 δw1 − c − δ 2 w1 which is positive due to assumption 1

> δw2 > c . Therefore, for any network g in which there exists a disconnected pair of
agents i and j, both of them are type a agents, there is a network g ′ = g + ij with higher total utility.
2

1

Thus, the efficient network belongs to the set of networks in which type a agents are completely
connected among themselves. Next we will show that the efficient network is a member of the set of
connected networks in which type a agents are completely connected among themselves. Let g ′′ be a
network in which each pair of type a agents are directly connected and there is a pair of agents with no
path between them. One component of this network includes at least all the type a agents while all the
other components include only type b agents. Consider a pair of type a agent (i) and type b agent (j)
who do not share the same component. Such a pair exists in any disconnected network. The minimal
difference in total utility if these agents connect, will be the differences in these two agents' utilities
assuming that the new link does not improve any other shortest path in the network (see footnote 35).
Thus, the minimal difference for both agents is 2(δw2 − c ) which is positive since δw2 > c . Thus,

g ′′ is not efficient since the total utility in g ′′ + ij is strictly higher. Thus, the efficient network is the

network that maximizes the total utility of connected networks in which each pair of type a agents is
directly connected. The last step is to show that the one-gate minimally connected core-periphery
network in which all the core agents are of type a and all the periphery agents are of type b is this
network. In any connected network in which each pair of type a agents is directly connected, there are

k (k − 1)
l (l − 1)
paths between two type a agents, kl paths between type a and type b agents and
2
2

paths between two type b agents. Since there is a complete sub-graph of the type a agents all their

k (k − 1)
paths are direct links. Denote by K 1 ≥ 1 the number of direct links between type a
2
and type b agents (it must be at least one since it is a connected network) and by K 2 ≥ 0 the number
of direct links between two type b agents. Thus, there are kl − K 1 indirect links between type a and
l (l − 1)
type b agents and
− K 2 indirect links between two type b agents. In addition, since there are l
2
type b agents and the network is connected, it must be that K 1 + K 2 ≥ l . The maximal overall value
internal

of this network is achieved when all the indirect links are of length two, and it is:

k (k − 1)
(2δw1 − 2c ) + K1 (2δw2 − 2c ) + K 2 (2δw3 − 2c ) + 2δ 2 w2 (kl − K1 ) + 2δ 2 w3  l (l − 1) − K 2 
2
 2


The overall value of a one-gate minimally connected core-periphery network in which all the core
agents are of type a and all the periphery agents are of type b is:

k (k − 1)
(2δw1 − 2c ) + l (2δw2 − 2c ) + 2δ 2 w2 (k − 1)l + 2δ 2 w3 l (l − 1) .
2
2

between

(

the

maximal

)

value

(

and

the

)

one-gate

The

network

difference
value

is

2(K 1 − l ) δw2 − δ w2 − c + 2 K 2 δw3 − δ w3 − c . Note that this difference has to be non2

2

negative since the maximal value has to be at least as high as the total utility of the one-gate minimally

(

)

(

)

connected network. Therefore, it must be that (l − K 1 ) c − δw2 + δ w2 ≥ K 2 c − δw3 + δ w3 .
Since c >

(δ − δ )w > (δ − δ )w ,
2

2

2

3

2

2

it holds that c − δw2 + δ w2 < c − δw3 + δ w3 and
2

2

K1 = l and K 2 = 0 . Note that the first option
violates the connectivity condition - K 1 + K 2 ≥ l . In conclusion, the highest total utility among
therefore it must be that either l − K 1 > K 2 or

connected networks is achieved if this network has the type a agents completely connected among
themselves, no connections between type b agents and l connections between type a agents and type b
agents. Due to connectivity it must be that the l links between type b agents and type a agents are
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divided such that each type b agent has exactly one such link. Therefore, the network belongs to the set
of minimally connected core-periphery networks. Moreover, we showed that the one-gate minimally
connected core-periphery network achieves the maximum. To show that other minimally connected
core-periphery networks do not achieve the maximum note that if all type b agents connect to the same
type a agent it increases the utility from the indirect links within the type b agents and does not change
the utility from other types of connections (the connections between type a agents are still of length one
and l of the intertype connections are of length one and the rest are of length two). Hence, the network
that achieves the highest total utility among all connected networks is the one-gate minimally
connected core-periphery networks in which all the core agents are of type a and all the periphery
agents are of type b. Thus, we showed that one-gate minimally connected core-periphery networks in
which all core agents are of type a and all periphery agents are of type b maximizes the total utility of
connected networks in which all type a agents are completely connected among themselves. Since
earlier we showed that disconnect networks and networks in which there are type a agents which are
not directly connected are inefficient, the one-gate minimally connected core-periphery networks in
which all core agents are of type a and all periphery agents are of type b is strongly efficient and there
are no other efficient networks.
Proof of proposition 4
Let g be the disconnected core-periphery network in which all core agents are of type a and all
periphery agents are of type b. To show that g is pairwise stable we have to verify that pairs of type a
agents would not like to severe their link, while any other pair of agents would not like to form a link.
First, let us consider the links between the periphery agents. The value to the agents from being
completely isolated is zero while the value for each of them from being directly connected is δw3 − c .
Since c > δw2 > δw3 no pair of periphery agents in the disconnected core-periphery network would
like to form a link. Second, let us consider a pair of a periphery agent and a core agent. The core agent
gains, by forming the link, δw2 − c since no indirect connections are formed through the periphery
agent. Since c > δw2 no pair of core agent and periphery agent in the disconnected core-periphery
network would like to form a link (note that the considerations of the periphery agent are irrelevant in
this case due to the mutual consent requirement). Third, let us consider the link between the core
agents. If there are only two core agents in the network, severing the link between them will turn the
network into the empty network and therefore they keep the link since δw1 > c . If there are more than
two core agents in the network, a core agent gains the cost of the link from severing the link. In
addition, her direct contact with her fellow core agent becomes 2-link path. Thus, her net utility gains
from severing the link are

(δ − δ )w
2

1

δ 2 w1 − (δw1 − c )

and therefore the agent will keep the link since

> c . In conclusion, we showed that the disconnected core-periphery network in which all

core agents are of type a and all periphery agents are of type b is pairwise stable. Note that this
observation does not depend on the value of Q and therefore it is relevant for both 4.1 and 4.2. We will
deal with the uniqueness of this pairwise stable network after the proving the efficiency results for both
4.1 and 4.2. We will prove that the efficient network is either a one-gate minimally connected coreperiphery network where all the core agents are of type a and all the periphery agents are of type b
(when Q > 0 ) or the disconnected core-periphery network where all the core agents are of type a and
all the periphery agents are of type b (when Q < 0 ). We will first show that the efficient network has
no pair of type a agents which are not directly connected. Let g be a network in which there is a
disconnected pair of agents i and j, both of them are type a agents. Consider the network g ′ = g + ij .
The minimal difference in total utility between g ′ and g is the differences in these two agents' utilities
assuming that they have a path of length two between them and that this link does not improve any
other shortest path in the network. Thus, the minimal difference for both agents is

(δ − δ )w

(

2 δw1 − c − δ 2 w1

)

> c . Therefore, for any network g in which there exists a
disconnected pair of agents i and j, both of them are type a agents, there is a network g ′ = g + ij with
which is positive since

2

1

higher total utility. Thus, the efficient network belongs to the set of networks in which type a agents are
completely connected. Next we will show that the one-gate minimally connected core-periphery
network in which all the core agents are of type a and all the periphery agents are of type b has the
highest total utility among the set of connected networks. Consider the maximal overall value of a
connected network in which type a agents are completely connected among themselves. In any such
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k (k − 1)
paths between two type a agents, kl paths between type a and type b
2

network there are

l (l − 1)
paths between two type b agents. Since there is a complete sub-graph of the type a
2
k (k − 1)
agents all their internal
paths are direct links. Denote by K 1 ≥ 1 the number of direct links
2

agents and

between type a and type b agents (it must be at least one since it is a connected network) and by
K 2 ≥ 0 the number of direct links between two type b agents. Thus, there are kl − K1 indirect links

l (l − 1)
− K 2 indirect links between two type b agents. Note
2
that since there are l type b agents it must be that K 1 + K 2 ≥ l . The maximal overall value of this

between type a and type b agents and

network

is

achieved

when

all

the

indirect

links

are

of

length

two:

k (k − 1)
(2δw1 − 2c ) + K1 (2δw2 − 2c ) + K 2 (2δw3 − 2c ) + 2δ 2 w2 (kl − K1 ) + 2δ 2 w3  l (l − 1) − K 2 
2
 2


The overall value of a one-gate minimally connected core-periphery network in which all the core
agents are of type a and all the periphery agents are of type b is

k (k − 1)
(2δw1 − 2c ) + l (2δw2 − 2c ) + 2δ 2 w2 (k − 1)l + 2δ 2 w3 l (l − 1) .
2
2

between

(

the

maximal

)

value

and

(

)

the

The

one-gate

difference

network

is

2(K 1 − l ) δw2 − δ w2 − c + 2 K 2 δw3 − δ w3 − c . Note that this difference has to be non2

2

negative since the maximal value has to be at least as high as the total utility of the one-gate minimally

(

)

(

)

connected network. Therefore, it must be that (l − K 1 ) c − δw2 + δ w2 ≥ K 2 c − δw3 + δ w3 .
Since c > δw2 >

(δ − δ )w > (δ − δ )w , it holds that
2

2

2

3

and therefore it must be that either l − K 1 > K 2 or

2

2

c − δw2 + δ w2 < c − δw3 + δ w3
2

2

K1 = l and K 2 = 0 . Note that the first option

violates the connectivity condition K 1 + K 2 ≥ l . In conclusion, the highest total utility among
connected networks is achieved if this network has complete clique of all type a agents, no connections
between type b agents and l connections between type a agents and type b agents. Due to connectivity
it must be that the l links between type b agents and type a agents are divided such that each type b
agent has exactly one such link. Therefore, the network belongs to the set of minimally connected coreperiphery networks in which all the core agents are of type a and all the periphery agents are of type b.
Moreover, we showed that the one-gate minimally connected core-periphery network achieves the
maximum. To show that other minimally connected core-periphery networks do not achieve the
maximum note that if all type b agents connect to the same type a agent it increases the utility from the
indirect links within the type b agents and does not change the utility from other types of connections
(the connections between type a agents are still of length one and l of the intertype connections are of
length one and the rest are of length two). Hence, the network that achieves the highest total utility
among all connected networks is the one-gate minimally connected core-periphery networks in which
all the core agents are of type a and all the periphery agents are of type b. So far we showed that the
efficient network is either the one-gate minimally connected core-periphery networks in which all core
agents are of type a and all periphery agents are of type b or a disconnected network in which all type a
agents are completely connected among themselves and this a-component is a one-gate minimally
connected core-periphery network in which all core agents are of type a and all periphery agents are of
type b (as a conclusion from the proof above). For the last step, let an m-one-gate network be a network
in which all the type a agents are completely connected among themselves, m of the type b agents are
connected to the same type a agent (the gate) and the rest of the type b agents are completely isolated.
We will show that the (l − 1) -one-gate network has higher total utility than all the disconnected
networks in which there is at least one link outside the a-component. Let us explore the disconnected
networks in which there is at least one link outside the a-component. Since the agents who are not
connected to the a-component are all of type b we can use proposition 1 of Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996) to assert that since c >

(δ − δ )w
2

3

this group of agents will achieve its maximal total utility

either as a star encompassing all the group members (b-star) or as an empty network. Thus, we have to
show that the (l − 1) -one-gate network has higher total utility than the double-component network that
combines the a-component and the b-star. Let the number of agents in the b-star be h and let the utility
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of the a-component be X . The total utility of the network if the group is organized as a star is

X + 2(h − 1)(δw3 − c ) + (h − 1)(h − 2 )δ 2 w3 . The total utility of the network if all the leaves of the

b-star replace their links from the b-star center to the gate of the a-component (to create an

(l − 1) -

one-gate network) is at least X + 2(h − 1)(δw2 − c ) + (h − 1)(h − 2 )δ w3 since the previous b-star
2

center is now isolated (note that it is minimal since we do not count the indirect connections between
the original members of the a-component and the h − 1 newcomers). Since the second expression is

larger, the total utility of the (l − 1) -one-gate network is higher than all the disconnected networks in
which there is at least one link outside the a-component. Note that so far we have shown that the l-onegate network has higher utility than all the connected networks and that the (l − 1) -one-gate has higher
total utility than all the disconnected networks in which there is at least one link outside the acomponent. Remember that as a conclusion from the previous proof above, the m-one-gate network has
the highest utility among the set of networks in which the a-component includes m type b agents and
there are no links among the other l-m type b agents. Thus, we have shown that the efficient network is
the network that achieves the highest total utility among the set of m-one-gate networks
( m = 0, K , l ).
The
total
utility
of
an
m-one-gate
network
is

k (k − 1)δw1 + 2mδw2 + 2(k − 1)mδ 2 w2 + m(m − 1)δ 2 w3 − k (k − 1)c − 2mc . It is easy to see
that the total utility of the m-one-gate network is an upward parabola in m and therefore its maximum is
achieved on one of the edges – either m = l (one-gate minimally connected core-periphery networks
in which all the core agents are of type a and all the periphery agents are of type b) or m = 0
(disconnected core-periphery network in which all the core agents are of type a and all the periphery
agents are of type b). By the definition of Q it is clear that the difference between the total utility of
these networks equals exactly 2lQ . Therefore, if Q > 0 the set of one-gate minimally connected
core-periphery networks in which all core agents are of type a and all periphery agents are of type b are
strongly efficient and there are no other efficient networks (proposition 4.2.3) while if Q < 0 the
disconnected core-periphery network in which all core agents are of type a and all periphery agents are
of type b is the unique strongly efficient network (efficiency part of proposition 4.1). It is left to show
that when Q < 0 there are no pairwise stable networks besides the disconnected core-periphery
network in which all core agents are of type a and all periphery agents are of type b (for this part of the
proof we will denote this network by d) and to characterize the non core-periphery networks which are
pairwise stable when Q > 0 . First, we will show that if Q < 0 the unique pairwise stable network is
d. Let g be another pairwise stable network. Therefore, either g has two type a agents which are not
directly connected or it has a directly connected pair of agents, at least one of them is a type b agent.
Let g ′ be a network in which there is a pair of type a agents who are not directly connected. In order
to examine the minimal contribution of a direct link to these agents' utilities, assume that a path of
length two links them and that connecting them directly does not shorten any of their other
connections. Their net utility gains from a direct connection are

(δ − δ )w

δw1 − c − δ 2 w1 .

Since

> c it will surely be beneficial for these agents to connect directly, let alone if a longer
path links them and/or if this link shortens their connections to other agents. Thus, g ′ is not pairwise
stable. Let g ′′ be a pairwise stable network in which each pair of type a agents are directly connected
2

1

and some of the type a agents are directly connected to type b agents. Let us compare the utilities of the
agents in network d to their utilities in g ′′ . Type a agents that are not connected directly to type b
agents in g ′′ surely have higher utility in g ′′ than in d since they benefit from the indirect
connections to type b agents without changing their costs. Type a agents that have direct connections to
type b agents in g ′′ have the utility they had in d plus the utility they gain from their direct
connections to type b agents. Using lemma 1, if g ′′ is pairwise stable, it is straightforward that the
total relative contribution of each type b agent to his type a neighbor must be non-negative. Therefore,
the total utility of each of the type a agents is at least as high in g ′′ as it is in d. Thus, the sum of type
a agents' utilities in g ′′ is at least as high as it is in d. (note that it might be equal if there is only one
type a agent in the network). Since in network d the total utility of type b agents is zero and since
network d is uniquely efficient then there must be at least one type b agent in g ′′ with negative utility
which contradicts, by the implication of lemma 1, the stability of g ′′ . Thus, in a pairwise stable
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network when Q <

0 type agents are completely connected between themselves and completely
disconnected from type b agents. Let g ′′′ be a pairwise stable network in which each pair of type a
agents are directly connected, there are no direct links between type a and type b agents and there is at
least one pair of type b agents that are directly connected. Note that the sum of utilities of type a agents
in g ′′′ is equal to the sum of utilities of type a agents in network d. Thus, it must be that the sum of
utilities of type b agents in g ′′′ is negative, since d is uniquely efficient and the sum of utilities of type
b agents in d is zero. Therefore, there is at least one type b agent in g ′′′ that have negative utility which
contradicts, by the implication of lemma 1, the stability of g ′′′ . This completes the proof that if

Q < 0 the disconnected core-periphery network in which all core agents are of type a and all
periphery agents are of type b is the unique pairwise stable network.
Next, we will show some characteristics of pairwise stable networks when Q > 0 . We conjecture, but
fail to prove, that when Q > 0 and assumption 1 and 2 hold, the disconnected core-periphery network
in which all core agents are of type a and all periphery agents are of type b is the unique pairwise stable
network. The following two examples show that when the heterogeneity condition is not satisfied the
disconnected core-periphery network is not unique.
Consider the following network where the black circles stand for type a
agents and white circles stand for type b agents. One can verify that
under the values

c=

161
1
9
, δ = , w1 = 3, w2 = 1, w3 =
, the
320
2
10

range and assumption 1 is satisfied while assumption 2 is violated.
However, in this case this non-core-periphery network is pairwise
stable. Moreover, is assumption 2 is violated there are pairwise stable
networks which are neither connected nor disconnected core-periphery
networks. One can verify, for example, that the network with two
connected type a agents and a separate circle of eleven type b agents is
pairwise stable in the given range under the following values:

25
1
1600
, δ = , w1 = 4, w2 = 1, w3 =
.
32
2
1921
Next we will show that when Q > 0 any pairwise stable network, which is not the disconnected corec=

periphery network, is a non-core-periphery network in which all type a agents are directly connected to
each other and there is no type b agent with exactly one direct connection. Let g ′ be a network in
which there is a pair of type a agents who are not directly connected. In order to examine the minimal
contribution of a direct link to these agents' utilities, assume that a path of length two links them and
that connecting them directly does not shorten any of their other connections. Their net utility gains

(

)

from a direct connection are δw1 − c − δ w1 . Since δ − δ w1 > c it will surely be beneficial for
these agents to connect directly, let alone if a longer path links them and/or if this link shortens their
connections to other agents. Thus, g ′ is not pairwise stable, and the set of pairwise stable networks is
2

2

a subset of the set of all networks in which each pair of type a agents are directly connected. Let g ′′ be
a network in which there is a type b agent, agent i, who has exactly one direct connection. Consider,
agent j who is the only agent with a direct connection to agent i. agent j's net utility from the direct link
to agent i is δwk − c(k ∈ {2,3}) . Since max δwk − c = δw2 − c < 0 , agent j, whatever her type is,
k∈{2 , 3}

would prefer to severe the link and therefore g ′′ is not pairwise stable. Next we will show that the
disconnected core-periphery network is the only pairwise stable core-periphery network. Let g ′′′ be a
non-disconnected core-periphery network is which all the core agents are of type a and all the
periphery agents are of type b. Hence, all the type a agents in g ′′′ are directly connected between
themselves, while all the type b agents are directly disconnected among themselves and there is at least
one type b agent who is not isolated and is connected directly to type a agent. From the proof above,
we can deduce that any type b agent who is not isolated has at least two direct connections to type a
agents. However, since the type a agents are completely connected they can severe the link to this type
b agent and still have a path of length two connecting them to her. They will prefer to do so since

(δ − δ )w

′′′ is not pairwise stable. Thus, we showed that any pairwise stable
2 < c . Therefore, g
network is either the disconnected core-periphery network or a non-core-periphery network in which
2
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all type a agents are directly connected to each other and there is no type b agent with exactly one
direct connection.
Proof of proposition 5
First we will show that no core-periphery network in which all core agents are of type a and all
periphery agents are of type b is pairwise stable under the given range if assumption 1 holds. Let g be a
core-periphery network in which all core agents are of type a and all periphery agents are of type b and
there is at least one direct link between type a and type b agents. Assume that g is pairwise stable. By
the definition of core periphery networks there are no direct links between type b agents and every pair
of type a agents maintains a direct link. Let agent i be a type a agent and agent j be a type b agent, such
that ij ∈ g . Thus, the benefit that agent i receives from this link is δw2 − c since this link provides

(

)

agent i with no shorter paths except the one to agent j. Since c > δ − δ 2 w1 , assumption 1 guarantees
that c > δw2 and therefore the benefit of this link to agent i is negative and he would like to severe it.
Therefore g is not pairwise stable. It is left to show that the disconnected core periphery network in
which all core agents are of type a and all periphery agents are of type b is not pairwise stable. Assume
that it is pairwise stable. The net benefit of agent i of type a from the direct link to another agent j, also
of type a, is δw1 − c since this link does not shorten any of his other paths. If agent i drops the link to
agent j he has a path of length two to agent j through a third type a agent ( k ≥ 3 ) which yields δ 2 w1 .

(

)

Since c > δ − δ 2 w1 , agent i would like to severe his link to agent j. This contradicts the assumption
that the disconnected core periphery network in which all core agents are of type a and all periphery
agents are of type b is pairwise stable. We showed that if c > δ − δ 2 w1 , k ≥ 3 and assumption 1
holds, then there is no pairwise stable core periphery network in which all core agents are of type a and
all periphery agents are of type b. Note that if assumption 1 is violated then this statement is false. One
1
3
1
can verify that under the values c = , δ = , w1 = 2, w2 = 1, w3 = , k = 3, l = 6 , the linking costs
2
4
4
range and the minimal number of type a agents are satisfied, assumption 1 is violated and the
minimally connected core periphery network in which all core agents are of type a, all periphery agents
are of type b and each type a agent is directly connected to two type b agents is pairwise stable. Now
we will show that the efficient network is never a core-periphery network in which all core agents are
of type a and all periphery agents are of type b. Denote by A g the set of type a agents in network g.

(

)

Denote by Bcg the set of type b agents who are not isolated in network g and by Big the set of type b
agents who are isolated in network g. Let g ∈ CPp ,q if g is a core-periphery network in which all the
core agents are of type a and all the periphery agents are of type b, it has p links between type a agents
and type b agents and q = Bcg

37

(Naturally, p ≥ q ). Let g ∈ HCPp ,q if g ∈ CPp ,q and every pair of

agents in Bcg have a length two path between them (they have at least one common core neighbor). Let

g ∈ GCPp ,q if g ∈ CPp ,q and there is a member of A g (the "gate") which is directly connected to all
the agents in Bcg . By definition, φ ≠ GCPp , q ⊂ HCPp ,q ⊂ CPp , q . In what follows we will divide the
total utility of a given network into four components: the utility from the connections between two type
a agents, the utility from connections between two type b agents, the utility from connections between
type a and type b agents and the total linking costs38. Given p and q, the difference in total utility
among the members of CPp ,q comes solely from the connections between pairs of type b agents. This
is true since the type a agents are completely connected, the total linking costs are identical between all

37

The disconnected core periphery network belongs to CP0,0 , the minimally connected core periphery

networks belong to CPl ,l and the maximally connected core periphery network belongs to CPlk ,l .

v(g ) =

∑

u i (g ) =

i∈N


d

δ ij f t i , t j −
 j∈N \{i}


(

∑ ∑
i∈N

)


d
δ ij f t i , t j −
c =
c
j∈N \{i}:ij∈g 
(i , j )∈N × N :ij∈g
 (i , j )∈N × N

∑

v(g ) =

∑δ

(i , j )∈N × N

i≠ j
t i = a ,t j = a

w1 +

∑δ

d ij

(i , j )∈N × N

w2 +

i≠ j
ti = a , t j =b
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these networks since the number of connections is fixed, all these networks possess the same number of
direct links between type a agents and type b agents and therefore also the same number of length two
connections (there are no longer shortest paths between type a and type b agents due to the complete
connectivity of the core). Moreover, since the members of Big do not contribute anything to the total
utility, the difference in total utility between the members of CPp ,q are solely due to the internal
connections of the members of Bcg . Since the networks in CPp ,q are core periphery networks such
that all core agents are of type a and all periphery agents are of type b, they possess no direct links
between type b agents. Therefore the highest total utility for members of CPp ,q is achieved by the
members of HCPp , q since every pair of connected type b agent has a length two path. In particular,
this value is achieved by all the members of GCPp ,q . Now we will show that the value achieved by the
members of GCPq ,q is higher than the value achieved by the members of GCPp ,q for all p > q . Given
q, the differences in total utility between the members of those groups comes solely from the benefits
and costs of connections between type b agents and type a agents different from the gate. This is true
since the type a agents are completely connected, the type b agents have length two path among
themselves and the total linking costs excluding the connections between type b agents and type a
agents different from the gate are identical. The members of GCPq ,q have no links between type b

agents and type a agents different from the gate and therefore their additional net benefit is zero.
However, the members of GCPp ,q for p > q have at least one link between type b agent and type a
agent different from the gate. Any such link does not change the utility of other agents since they
already have a path of length of at most two with both types of agents. Therefore, the contribution of
this link to the total utility comes only from the shortening of the path between those agents from a
length two to a length one and each of them pays c for that benefit. Therefore its total contribution is
2 δ − δ 2 w2 − c which is negative. Thus, given q, we showed that for every p > q the total utility of

[(

)

]

the members of GCPp , q is lower than the total utility of the members of GCPq ,q by

[(

)

]

2( p − q ) δ − δ 2 w2 − c . Since for all p > q no member of CPp ,q achieves higher total utility then the
members of GCPp ,q , we showed that none of these networks is efficient. It is left to show that for
every q the members of CPq ,q are not efficient. Actually, since the members of HCPq ,q achieve the
highest total utility among the members of CPq ,q , it is left to show that for every q the members of

HCPq ,q are not efficient. The general architecture of these networks is of a core including all type a
agents completely connected among themselves, q type b agents with single link to a type a agent (the
"gate") and l-q isolated type b agents. We will show that for every q there is a non core periphery
architecture which yields higher total utility, namely networks in which the type a agents form a star
around the gate while the type b agents do not change their linking scheme (all-star architecture). Note
that the utilities of the type b agents in both architectures are the same – the isolates have zero utility,
the non isolates have one direct link to a type a agent and length two paths to all other non isolated
agents (of both types). The utilities of the type a agents from the connections with type b agents are
also identical – the gate is connected directly to each of the type b agents while the others have paths of
length two to each of them. Another unchanged component is the utilities from the links of the non gate
type a agents with the gate. Thus, the difference in utility comes from the benefits and costs of the
internal connections of the type a agents who are not the gate. In the architecture of the HCPq ,q 's
members the contribution to total utility from a connection of two non gate type a agents is 2[δw1 − c ]
while the contribution to total utility from a connection of two non gate type a agents in the all-star

(

)

architecture is 2δ 2 w1 ( k ≥ 3 ). Since c > δ − δ w1 the total contribution of such a connection is
higher in the all-star architecture. Therefore, for every q the non core periphery all-star architecture
yields higher total utility than the members of HCPq ,q . Hence, we found that every core-periphery
2

network in which all the core agents are of type a and all the periphery agents are of type b has a
network which has higher total utility. Thus, we showed that core-periphery network in which all the
core agents are of type a and all the periphery agents are of type b are not efficient.
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